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Abstract

Cybersecurity and privacy have now become a matter of increasing concern for citizens, the
private sector, and the Indonesian government. The government is currently struggling to
combat cyberattacks and data breaches. Indonesia is, in fact, in the early stages of developing
a national cybersecurity strategy. The legal framework for cybersecurity in Indonesia is still
weak. The only legal basis for regulating cybersecurity, privacy, and security, in Indonesia so far
is the Electronic Information and Transactions Law No. 11/2008 and its revised version Law
No.19/2016. Furthermore, the government through the Indonesian Ministry of Communication
and Information has just issued the implementing regulation called the Ministerial Regulation
Number 5 of 2020. This Ministerial Regulation has several debatable articles and provisions, such
as regarding the registration obligation, the content management and safe harbor concept, as
well as the censorship issues, and the access availability to government. This article would like to
address and examine whether it’s lawful for Indonesian government institutions or law enforcers
to request such access to electronic systems and users’ personal data from the Electronic Systems
Operators or internet service providers for surveillance and law enforcement purposes. The
article then provides legal steps or procedures as well as legal recommendations that Indonesian
government entities must follow before conducting such a legitimate electronic cyber operation.
This article will also compare those Indonesia’s digital surveillance practices with the United
States’ legal practices and lesson-learned on government surveillance.
Keywords: cybersecurity, privacy, surveillance, cyber operation, electronic systems operators,
legal practices.
Abstrak
Keamanan siber dan privasi kini semakin menjadi perhatian utama masyarakat, sektor swasta,
dan pemerintah Indonesia. Pemerintah saat ini sedang berjuang memerangi kejahatan siber dan
pelanggaran data. Indonesia, pada faktanya, masih berada dalam tahap awal pengembangan
strategi keamanan siber nasional. Kerangka hukum untuk keamanan siber di Indonesia masih
lemah. Satu-satunya dasar hukum yang mengatur mengenai keamanan privasi dan keamanan
siber di Indonesia sejauh ini hanyalah Undang-Undang Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik No.
11/2008 yang sudah direvisi dengan Undang-Undang No.19/2016. Selanjutnya, pemerintah
melalui Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika Indonesia baru saja mengeluarkan peraturan
pelaksanaan, yaitu Peraturan Menteri Nomor 5 Tahun 2020. Peraturan Menteri ini memiliki
beberapa pasal dan ketentuan yang masih diperdebatkan, seperti mengenai kewajiban
pendaftaran, pengelolaan konten, konsep “safe harbor,” serta masalah sensor, dan ketersediaan
akses kepada pemerintah. Artikel ini ingin membahas dan menelaah apakah diperbolehkan bagi
lembaga pemerintah atau penegak hukum Indonesia untuk meminta akses ke sistem elektronik
dan data pribadi pengguna tersebut dari Penyelenggara Sistem Elektronik atau penyedia layanan
internet untuk tujuan pengawasan dan penegakan hukum. Pasal tersebut kemudian memberikan
langkah-langkah atau prosedur hukum serta rekomendasi hukum yang harus diikuti oleh entitas
pemerintah Indonesia sebelum melakukan operasi siber elektronik yang sah tersebut. Artikel
ini juga akan membandingkan praktik pengawasan digital di Indonesia dengan praktik hukum
Amerika Serikat dan pembelajaran tentang pengawasan pemerintah.
Kata kunci: keamanan siber, privasi, pengawasan, operasi siber, penyelenggara sistem elektronik,
praktik hukum
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is clear that cybersecurity and privacy have now become a matter of increasing
concern for citizens, the private sector, and the Indonesian government. The
Indonesian National Cyber and Crypto Agency (Badan Siber dan Sandi Negara or
BSSN), for example, reported 290.3 million cases of cyberattacks in 2019.1 The
number significantly increased compared to the 232.4 million cases during the
previous year. Likewise, the Criminal Investigation Agency of the Indonesian National
Police (Bareskrim) saw an increase in police reports of cybercrimes, as 4,586 police
reports were filed on “Patrolisiber,” a Bareskim website for reporting cybercrime,
in 2019.2 This makes Indonesia one of the world’s most targeted countries for
cyberattacks. Some media reports and headlines, furthermore, claim that the number
of cyberattacks is now growing at an ‘alarming’ rate.

Not only struggling to combat those cyberattacks, but the Indonesian government
has also been investigating major data breach cases, most recently a data breach
that exposed the personal data of 1.3 million people registered in the country’s
electronic Health Alert Card (eHAC) system, a government tracing app used to tackle
Covid-19.3 These data breach cases potentially risk the user’s data exploitation as
they leaked names, home addresses, ID numbers, Covid-19 hospital tests, and more.
This eHAC data breach case was not the first case, previously, in May of the same
year, the personal data of Indonesian Healthcare and Social Security Agency (BPJS
Kesehatan) users were sold in an online forum known as Raid Forums for the price of
0.15 bitcoins by a user called ‘Kotz.’4Furthermore, last year, millions of personal data
were stolen from the very famous two Indonesian biggest e-commerce, Tokopedia
and Lazada. For Tokopedia, some even claimed the exposed 91 million personal data
was sold on the dark web.5 As for Lazada, at least 1.1 million data were sold illegally,
which involved Redmart databased hosted by a third party.6

While lacking data protection regulations and any related cybersecurity
provisions, Indonesia is, in fact, currently in the early stages of developing a national
cybersecurity strategy. The legal framework for cybersecurity in Indonesia is still
weak. For example, regarding the public-private partnership, there is no dedicated
cybersecurity public-private partnership in Indonesia. Therefore, Indonesia lacks
any joint public-private sector plan to address cybersecurity. Indeed, industry
representative associations exist, but none are dedicated to cybersecurity in
particular. And so far, there are no documented new public-private partnerships being
planned in Indonesia. Furthermore, there is no clear classified security law or policy,
and security practices spread across different legislation while there are no specific
cybersecurity provisions in place.7 All these situations and conditions make privacy
and security in Indonesia truly at risk.
1
“The Indonesian National Cyber and Crypto Agency, Annual Report 2020: Cybersecurity Monitoring”
(Jakarta, 2020), 11.
2
“The Indonesian National Cyber and Crypto Agency, Annual Report 2020: Cybersecurity Monitoring.”
3
Laila Afifa, “6 Major Data Breach Cases in Indonesia in Past 1.5 Years,” Tempo, September 3, 2021,
https://en.tempo.co/read/1501851/6-major-data-breach-cases-in-indonesia-in-past-1-5-years.
4
Afifa, “6 Major Data Breach Cases in Indonesia in Past 1.5 Years,” .
5
Afifa, “6 Major Data Breach Cases in Indonesia in Past 1.5 Years,”.
6
Afifa, “6 Major Data Breach Cases in Indonesia in Past 1.5 Years,”.
7
“Asia-Pacific Cybersecurity Dashboard,” The Software Alliance, accessed September 17, 2021, www.
bsa.org/APACcybersecurity.
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The only legal basis for regulating cybersecurity, privacy, and security, in Indonesia
so far is the Electronic Information and Transactions Law No. 11/20088 and its
revised version Law No.19/20169 (EIT Law). The EIT Law covers several offenses,
such as distributing illegal content, unauthorized access to another computer system
to gain information, and an illegal and unauthorized interception or wiretapping of
other computer systems or electronic systems. The EIT Law provides legal protection
for the content of electronic systems and electronic transactions. However, the EIT
Law does not cover some critical aspects of cybersecurity, such as information and
network infrastructure, and human resources with expertise in cybersecurity, as well
as most importantly, it does not govern how to protect the data and privacy itself and
the mechanism if there is a data breach or misuse of personal data.
From this EIT Law, furthermore, the government issued technical regulations in
Government Regulation No. 71/2019 on the Implementation of Electronic Systems
and Transactions (GR 71/2019).10 GR 71/2019 contains updates related to the
implementation of cybersecurity in electronic systems and transactions. Apart from
several articles related to the offenses regulated by the EIT Law, GR 71/2019 contains
stronger provisions regarding the protection of personal data and information and
website authentication to avoid fake, fraudulent, or scam websites. Besides, GR
71/2019 emphasizes the need for the government to prevent any harm to public
interests through the misuse of electronic information and electronic transactions
and the need to develop a national cybersecurity strategy.11
And eventually, to apply this GR 71/2019, the government through the Indonesian
Ministry of Communication and Information (the “Ministry”) has just issued the
implementing regulation called the Ministerial Regulation Number 5 of 2020 (MR5).
This MR5 has several debatable articles and provisions, such as regarding the
registration obligation, the content management and safe harbor concept, as well as
the censorship issues, and the access availability to the government.

This paper will specifically address and examine the latter issue, whether it’s
lawful for Indonesian government institutions or law enforcers to request such
access to electronic systems and users’ personal data from the “electronic systems
operators” (ESOs) or internet service providers for surveillance and law enforcement
purposes and what legal steps or procedures as well as the legal recommendations
that Indonesian government entities must follow before conducting such a legitimate
electronic cyber operation. This paper will also compare the Indonesian digital
surveillance practices with the United States’ legal practices and lesson-learned on
government surveillance.
8
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 11 Tahun 2008 tentang Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik, Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2008 Nomor 58, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 4843.
9
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 19 Tahun 2016 tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang
Republik Indonesia Nomor 11 Tahun 2008 tentang Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik, Lembaran Negara
Republik Indonesia Tahun 2016 Nomor 251, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 5952.
10
Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Nomor 71 Tahun 2019 tentang Penyelenggaraan Sistem
dan Transaksi Elektronik, Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2019 Nomor 185, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 6400.
11
Noor Halimah Anjani, “Policy Brief: Cybersecurity Protection in Indonesia,” Center for Indonesian
Policy Studies, accessed July 10, 2021, https://www.cips-indonesia.org/post/policy-brief-cybersecurityprotection-in-indonesia.
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II. A NEW POLEMIC REGULATION TO GOVERN DIGITAL SERVICES AND
PLATFORMS
The Indonesian Ministry of Communication and Information (the “Ministry”) has
just issued the Ministerial Regulation Number 5 of 2020 (MR5), which came into
force on November 24, 2020.12 MR5 is established to govern all private electronic
systems operators (ESOs) that are accessible in Indonesia. These are broadly defined
to include social media and other content-sharing platforms, digital marketplaces,
search engines, financial services, data processing services, and communications
services providing messaging or video calls and games (Art. 2 (2)). The new regulation
will affect many national and regional digital services and platforms, as well as
multinational companies like Google, Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok.

This MR5 has seven chapters and an extensive scope covering several essential
areas, most of them are still very debatable and problematic. Those highlighted
concerns are including overbroad and vague definitions, registration obligation and
data localization, sweeping notice and takedown orders, an excessive amount of
penalty for those who fail to comply, and granting authorities data access without
adequate procedural safeguards that we will be discussing later extensively in this
paper.
First, it has an overbroad scope. The private ESOs in MR5 are broadly defined as
‘any individual, business entity, or community’ that operates an ‘Electronic System’
involved in the ‘preparing, collecting, processing, analyzing, saving, displaying,
announcing, sharing and/or distributing’ of electronic information (Art. 1(4) and
(6)). Individuals and companies connected to websites, social media platforms, email
services, search engines, messaging services, mobile applications, and nearly any
other online service or application fall within the scope of the definition. As such, the
regulation encompasses the government’s regulatory authorities over virtually any
actor involved in any online activities.

Second, all private ESOs are required to register with and obtain a registration
certificate from the Ministry before providing their services in Indonesia (Art. 2).
Those that fail to register by May 24, 2021, will be blocked in Indonesia. Furthermore,
the registration process even requires those private ESOs to provide the Ministry
with information on the location of data management, processing, and storage and
to guarantee and implement the requirement to provide access to their electronic
systems and data in support of law enforcement and oversight efforts (Art. 3(4)).

Third, these private ESOs are also required to “ensure” that their platform does
not contain or facilitate the distribution of “prohibited content,” which would imply a
general obligation to monitor content (Art. 9). Failure to do so can lead to blocking of
the entire service as well (Art. 9 (6)). Just like famous Germany’s 2017 “NetzDG” law
and its followers in some other countries, MR5 also requires private ESOs to remove
or take down content within four hours for “urgent” requests and all other prohibited
content within 24 hours of being notified by the Ministry.13 Failure to do so can lead to
12
Peraturan Menteri Komunikasi dan Informatika Republik Indonesia Nomor 5 Tahun 2020 tentang
Penyelenggara Sistem Elektronik Lingkup Privat, Berita Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2020 Nomor
1376.
13
Heidy Tworek & Paddy Leerssen, “An Analysis of Germany’s NetzDG Law,” A Working Paper of the
Transatlantic High-Level Working Group on Content Moderation Online and Freedom of Expression, 2019,
https://www.ivir.n.
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blocking of the service (Art. 15 (9)) or, in the case of service providers that facilitate
user-generated content, substantial fines (Art. 15 (10)). Article 9 (3) furthermore
defines prohibited information and content as anything that violates any provision
of Indonesia’s laws and regulations, or creates “community anxiety” or “disturbance
in public order.” Article 9 (4) grants the Ministry to define this notion of “community
anxiety” and “public disorder.” It also forces these private ESOs to take down anything
that would “inform ways or provide access” to these prohibited documents.
Fourth, the regulation states that failure to comply with the various obligations
set out in the law can, in my opinion, lead to heavy and disproportionate penalties.
In particular, Art. 45 provides that private ESOs that fail to grant access to their
electronic data under Art. 21 are at risk of administrative sanctions enforced by the
Ministry. These may include a written warning, temporary termination, blocking
of their services in Indonesia, and revocation of their operating license. Cloud
computing operators who fail to grant access are only subjected to a written warning
or revocation of their operating license (Art. 46).

Similarly, failure to respond to notice and takedown orders on prohibited content
will first receive a written warning, either once every twenty-four hours or four hours
depending on the takedown window, and after three written warnings, a fine will be
issued. The fine amount is not explicitly established under the Regulation but is based
on the Indonesian Non-Tax State Revenue Law. It is highly concerning, however, that
the exact amount does not appear in the law and that the only guidance is provided
by statements from the regulator reported in official media, as between 100 and 500
million IDR per piece of content ($6,950 – $34,740).
And finally, one of the most controversial provisions under this regulation, for the
purpose of supervision and law enforcement, Indonesian ministries, institutions, and
law enforcement agencies can request access to a private ESOs’ electronic system
and electronic data, and the private ESO must provide them access upon receipt of
a request from the government authority. For this, private ESOs must choose at least
one liaison officer who is domiciled in Indonesia to be in charge of handling requests
for access from government authorities.
Those private ESOs must provide access to both their “systems” and their “data”
for “supervision” purposes whenever requested to do so. They must also allow law
enforcement authorities to access electronic data for criminal investigations into any
offense carrying a penalty of at least two years in prison (Art. 32).14 For access to
electronic “systems,” law enforcement must obtain a court order when investigating
offenses that carry a penalty of between two and five years, but not for those with a
possible sentence of more than five years. We do not understand the basis for this
distinction, since court orders are even more important when the possible criminal
penalties are greater (Art. 33).15
The majority of the public and independent NGOs claimed that those requirements
that authorities have direct access to systems or massive amounts of information

14
Electronic Data is defined to mean “data in electronic form, which is not limited to text, voice, image,
map, design, photography, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex, telecopy or
the likes, alphabets, sign, number, access code, symbol, or perforation.” MR5, Art. 2(3).
15
Electronic Systems is defined to mean “a series of electronic devices and procedure having the function to prepare, collect, manage, analyze, store, display, announce, transmit, and/or distribute Electronic
Information.” MR5, Art. 2(4).
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collected and stored by private actors are of serious concern.16 They are particularly
prone to abuse, tend to circumvent key procedural safeguards, and can exceed the
limits of what can be considered necessary and proportionate.17 Furthermore, MR5
authorizes enforcement officers to demand access to traffic data and electronic
user information, including names, home addresses, email addresses, and billing
information, for any investigation, without the need for a court order.

III. THE U.S. LEGAL PRACTICES ON GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE: A
COMPARISON
In the U.S., the Fourth Amendment restricts the government’s electronic
surveillance. The Fourth Amendment is among the greatest constitutional limits on
the government’s ability to exercise power over individuals. If the government obtains
evidence of a crime in a manner that violates the Fourth Amendment, as a general
rule, none of the evidence gathered during that search or seizure can be admitted
as evidence in the criminal trial of the individual whose rights were violated.18 This
Fourth Amendment’s application is also relevant to government surveillance and
other actions in cyberspace.

Furthermore, there are other U.S. legal restrictions on government surveillance,
i.e., the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) with its three components:
(1) the Stored Communications Act, which restricts government and private sector
access to communications and data that are stored on servers and in the cloud; (2)
the Wiretap Act, which restricts governments’ and the private sector’s ability to
monitor data while it is in transit; and (3) the pen register statute, which restricts the
government’s ability to obtain “noncontent” information, such as the to/from lines of
emails.
There are also the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, which
requires telecommunications carriers and equipment makers to assist U.S. law
enforcement with lawful surveillance, and the All Writs Act, and the government’s
attempts to use the eighteenth‐century law to compel smartphone manufacturers to
help the government access encrypted information. Indeed, both constitutional and
statutory restrictions on cyber-surveillance and operations are still developing, and
courts often are unsure what limits on government cyber operations are appropriate.
The complexities are compounded because many of the restrictions are drawn
from decades‐old statutes that did not contemplate cloud computing, social media,
and other technologies.19 However, this paper will only examine the comparison of
the Fourth Amendment and the ECPA application for the purpose of government
surveillance and law enforcement.
The Fourth Amendment application only restricts searches and seizures that are
conducted by a government entity or by a government agent that is acting for the
government. It is clear and definite through several Supreme Court decisions about
what can be categorized as a “government entity” or factors that can determine

16
“Indonesia: Suspend, Revise New Internet Regulation,” Human Rights Watch, accessed September
21, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/21/indonesia-suspend-revise-new-internet-regulation.
17
7 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/39/29,
para. 18.
18
Kosseff Jeff, Cybersecurity Law, (United States: Wiley, 2019), 69.
19
Kosseff Jeff, “Cybersecurity Law”.
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whether a private party can be considered a government agent. In other words, any
federal, state, or local government agency or department agency or department is
fully subject to the limits of the Fourth Amendment, including those agents or officers
that conduct electronic surveillance for the purpose of a criminal investigation.
Furthermore, the ECPA might be the most comprehensive U.S. law relating to
cyber-surveillance. It not only limits the ability of government agencies, such as law
enforcement, to obtain emails, monitor networks, and obtain internet traffic logs, but
it also imposes strict boundaries on the ability of service providers to provide other
private parties or the government with access to customer emails and other records.

The Stored Communications Act (SCA) regulates the ability of governments to
compel the release of-and service providers to disclose-stored communications such
as email messages and cloud content. “As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
observed, the SCA “reflects Congress’s judgment that users have a legitimate interest
in the confidentiality of communications in electronic storage at a communications
facility.”20 Furthermore, the SCA covers three general categories: (1) access to stored
communications;21 (2) voluntary disclosure of stored communications by service
providers;22 and (3) law enforcement agencies’ attempts to compel service providers
to disclose stored communications.”23

The first category can be seen as a supplement to the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act where criminal charges against computer hackers have been brought under both
the SCA and CFAA. The second category involves the restrictions placed on a service
provider’s ability to disclose its users’ information. In many ways, this is analogous
to privacy law. The third category limits the government’s ability to require service
providers to provide users’ information. Moreover, the SCA applies two types of
services: electronic communication services (ECS) and remote computing services
(RCS), since the definitions of these services are important for the SCA to impose
different requirements depending on whether a service is classified as an ECS or
RCS.24
The SCA defines both ECS and RCS clearly and distinctly, while ECS is defined
as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire
or electronic communications,”25 which are the “transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part
by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects
interstate or foreign commerce,”26 the SCA defines RCS as “the provision to the public
of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications
system.”27
Here, Section 2702 of the SCA restricts the ability of both ECS and RCS providers
to voluntarily disclose both communications contents and consumer records.
Disputes under this section commonly arise during discovery in civil cases; parties
to litigation often subpoena service providers for emails, logs, and other records. It
is obvious that the statute prohibits the ECS provider from knowingly divulging to
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
18 U.S.C. § 2701 - Unlawful access to stored communications.
18 U.S.C. § 2702 - Voluntary disclosure of customer communications or records.
18 U.S.C. § 2703 - Required disclosure of customer communications or records.
Kosseff, Jeff. Cybersecurity Law.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(15), 2711(1) - Crimes and Criminal Procedure.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(12), 2711(1) - Crimes and Criminal Procedure.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(12), 2711(2) - Crimes and Criminal Procedure.
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either the government or private parties “the contents of a communication while in
electronic storage by that service.”28 On the other hand, the RCS providers are also
prohibited from knowingly divulging contents of communications that are “carried
or maintained” on the service on behalf of—and received via electronic transmission
from—a subscriber or customer, for the purposes of storage or computer processing,
unless the customer has provided authorization for other services.29 The statute
broadly defines “contents” to include “any information concerning the substance,
purport, or meaning of that communication.”30
It is necessary to highlight that Section 2702 also contains several exceptions
that allow service providers to disclose communications content under limited
circumstances. In conclusion, the RCS and ECS providers still are prohibited from
disclosing customer records to government entities, unless (1) subject to a valid
warrant, subpoena, or order under Section 2703; (2) with the customer’s consent;
(3) “as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection
of the rights or property of the provider of that service;” (4) to the government, if
the provider believes in “good faith” that an emergency exists; or (5) to NCMEC in
connection with a child pornography investigation.

The next ECPA component is the Wiretap Act which restricts the ability of the
government and private parties to intercept communications as they are in transit.
However, the Wiretap Act’s broad prohibitions also contain several exceptions,
including for government purposes. It provides law enforcement with a limited ability
to intercept a “computer trespasser’s communications” with the service provider’s
authorization, as well as allows law enforcement to seek a court order for the
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications.31 Under this exception, law
enforcement must fulfill several requirements before obtaining an order that allows
them to intercept communications, including a “full and complete statement of the
facts” application for wiretap orders.
Moreover, before a court will grant a wiretap order, it must determine that
probable cause exists for three different elements: (1) that the target has committed, is
committing, or soon will commit a crime; (2) that the wiretap will lead to information
about this crime; and (3) that the target will use the communications facilities
specified in the wiretap application. In other words, although a court need not be
certain that the wiretap will uncover evidence of a crime, law enforcement must make
a substantial showing of probable cause to obtain a wiretap order. Furthermore, there
is also a definite period for a wiretap order authorization, that it may be authorized
for no longer than 30 days. If law enforcement needs an extension, then it must seek
an extension of up to 30 more days.

The last ECPA component would be the Pen Register Act which imposes a general
prohibition on the use of pen register and traps and trace devices, with a few key
exceptions, including if the pen register or trap and trace device is related to the
protection of the communications providers or their users to keep the service free of
abuse or unlawful service use;32 if the user has consented;33 or if the government has
28
29
30
31
32
33

18 U.S.C. § 2702 - Voluntary disclosure of customer communications or records.
18 U.S.C. § 2702 (a)(2)(B) - Voluntary disclosure of customer communications or records.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 (8), 2711(1) - Crimes and Criminal Procedure.
18 U.S.C. § 2518 - Procedure for interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications.
18 U.S.C. § 3121 (b)(2) - General prohibition on pen register and trap and trace device use; exception.
18 U.S.C. § 3121 (b)(2) - General prohibition on pen register and trap and trace device use; exception.
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IV. LEGAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT ELECTRONIC CYBER OPERATIONS
As the previous part of this paper provides a brief explanation of how legitimate
government surveillances are conducted in the U.S., as a comparison, here are some
legal recommendations that can be considered to improve the application of MR5 in
regulating the private ESOs in Indonesia, particularly when it deals with supervision
(surveillance) and law enforcement.
First of all, Indonesia needs to establish and strengthen any joint public-private
sector plan to address cybersecurity and privacy. As explained previously, there is
no dedicated cybersecurity public-private partnership in Indonesia, whereas we all
definitely agree that cyberspace is so unique in that it involves both public and private
infrastructure, and therefore the government recognizes that it has a role in securing
the internet. It’s important to realize that the government’s role in private sector
cybersecurity is not merely that of a regulator, it may also operate several programs
that are designed to help companies battle the ever-evolving field of cybersecurity
and privacy threats. Moreover, the government can act as a central repository of
cybersecurity and privacy information. Therefore, both the Indonesian government
and private ESOs have significant roles and must collaborate to secure the internet
and computer systems and fight cybercrimes.

Second, there is no such Fourth Amendment restriction in Indonesia that can
restrict the actions of the government. In contrast, MR5 seems to have a very wide
discretion for the government entity and agency that can get involved in conducting
the surveillance and law enforcement and has not yet so far defined who can legally
conduct the surveillance or which division of the ministries or entities. There are
hundreds of ministries and entities in Indonesia, which majority of them do not even
have any responsibilities for the purpose of law enforcement and taking appropriate
measures in conducting electronic surveillance.
Third, MR5 also broadly defines private ESOs as ‘any individual, business entity, or
community’ that operates an ‘Electronic System’ involved in the ‘preparing, collecting,
processing, analysing, saving, displaying, announcing, sharing and/or distributing’
of electronic information. This very broad definition may increase the chance of the
government’s regulatory powers to virtually any actor engaged in any online activity.
Therefore, the government must narrow the terms or description of what can be
defined both as “Ministries” and “Private ESOs” for the sake of legal certainty.

Fourth, as explained above, the three sections of U.S. ECPA provide very different
safeguards and constraints regarding the ability of the government, as well as the
private sectors, to access an electronic communication, whether it is classified as “in
transit” or “in storage,” since it is crucial in determining how much privacy is afforded
to that particular communication at any given moment. In contrast, MR5 does not
define any classification of electronic communication or electronic data that can be
accessed by the government, whether is in transit or storage. MR5 only gives a broad
definition of the meaning of electronic data and electronic systems. Therefore, it’s
necessary for the Indonesian government to clearly distinguish each classification of
electronic communication or electronic data that can be disclosed to the government,
34

18 U.S.C. § 3121 (a) - General prohibition on pen register and trap and trace device use; exception.
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whether electronic data is classified as in transit or storage. It is because the
distinction between each classification of such electronic data is vital. As we will see,
the designation may play an important role in determining the privacy protections
that the regulation affords to a service’s users.

Fifth, most importantly, as described previously, almost all these surveillance
statutes require the government to obtain a valid warrant, subpoena, or court order
with a strict and high standard application. MR5, in fact, regulates the requirements
for the government to obtain a court order, however, it does not explain clearly the
prerequisites in applying such a warrant or court order, including the obligation to
provide prior notice to the customers or subscribers; the legal conditions for the
warrant requirement exception (i.e., exigent circumstances); or even the obligation
for the government to prove whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.

MR5 only states in its provision that for access to electronic “systems,” law
enforcement must obtain a court order when investigating offenses that carry a
penalty of between two and five years, but not for those with a possible sentence of
more than five years. It is even getting more doubtful to understand the basis for this
distinction since court orders are even more important when the possible criminal
penalties are greater. Therefore, it’s important for the MR5 to include specific and
legitimate requirements that are obliged for the government to fulfill before the court
can grant its order, such as it must determine that probable cause exists for three
different elements: (1) that the target has committed, is committing, or soon will
commit a crime; (2) that the electronic data or transaction will lead to information
about this crime; and (3) that the target will use the communications facilities
specified in the ESO’s applications or internet services.

Sixth, it’s necessary to underline the importance of customers’ or subscribers’
presence in this issue. Under the U.S. SCA, for example, the RCS providers are
prohibited from knowingly divulging contents of communications that are “carried
or maintained” on the service on behalf of—and received via electronic transmission
from—a subscriber or customer, for the purposes of storage or computer processing,
unless the customer has provided authorization for other services.35 In other words, the
internet service providers are required to inform the subscribers or the customers
before they can disclose their personal data to the government. It’s also stated that
for SCA purposes, in order to obtain communications via a subpoena or order, the
government must provide prior notice to the subscriber or customer.36 In contrast, the
MR5 does not regulate the obligation to get any lawful consent from the customers
or users before the private ESOs can give access or disclose any electronic data to the
government. Therefore, it’s crucial for the government to consider this requirement
to be implemented, as the right to be informed is one of the fundamental rights of
people in cyberspace that has to be respected.
And last but not least, there is a strict and definite period of validity. As for
ECPA’s section 2703’s restrictions for the disclosure of communications content

35
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2)(B) - Voluntary disclosure of customer communications or records (prohibiting the disclosure of communications contents that are on RCS “solely for the purpose of providing storage
or computer processing services to such subscriber or customer, if the provider is not authorized to access
the contents of any such communications for purposes of providing any services other than storage or
computer processing.”).
36
18 U.S.C. § 2705(1)(A) - Voluntary disclosure of customer communications or records.
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depend on whether the provider is an ECS or RCS provider, and the length of time
the communications content has been stored, the Wiretap Act also has a specific
period of authorization. On the other hand, MR5 even does not specifically mention
this period, for how long the government may conduct such surveillance or given the
access to disclose the user’s electronic data and transactions. Therefore, to improve
the legal certainty and legitimacy of electronic surveillance, this MR5 must add a
definite period for the government entities and agencies when they are involved in
cyber operations.

There is also one interesting policy under this U.S. electronic surveillance regulation
that the federal law will provide legal immunity to the online service providers for
their fulfillment of one specific duty, in this case, the child pornography violation. So, if
the online service providers (e.g., email services or internet service providers) obtain
actual knowledge that a customer appears to have violated federal child pornography
laws, they are required by federal law to file a report with National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children (NCMEC).37 NCMEC then reviews the report, as well as the
apparent child pornography content, and if it determines that the content is in fact
child pornography, it provides information to local, state, or federal law enforcement
agencies. As the providers are provided with this legal immunity, they cannot be sued
for filing an NCMEC report if a customer appears to violate the Child Pornography
Laws on their services.38 So, it would be a new positive attitude for the private ESOs
in Indonesia if they can also be provided with such legal immunity once they find any
serious criminal offenses, such as the pornography, terrorism, or narcotics abuse so
that they will voluntarily file a report with assigned government entities.

V. CONCLUSION

The Indonesian government has a new legal framework for conducting electronic
surveillance for the purpose of law enforcement. Indeed, it’s part of the government’s
main tasks and responsibilities to regulate and secure the internet in this digital age
together with the private ESOs. However, it is also crucial to maintain the essential
rules that the digital rights of the civil society must always be respected no matter
how the government’s intention is actually to protect networks and users. Therefore,
in order to establish a more legitimate government electronic surveillance activities,
there are some legal recommendations that the Indonesian government may consider
to improve the application of MR5 in regulating the private ESOs, particularly when it
deals with supervision (surveillance) and law enforcement.

37
38

18 U.S.C. § 2258A - Reporting requirements of providers.
18 U.S.C. § 2258B - Limited liability for providers or domain name registrars.
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